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Abstract. Spider diagrams are based on Euler and Venn/Peirce dia-
grams, forming a system which is as expressive as monadic first order
logic with equality. Rather than being primarily intended for logicians,
spider diagrams were developed at the end of the 1990s in the context
of visual modelling and software specification. We examine the original
goals of the designers, the ways in which the notation has evolved and its
connection with the philosophical origins of the logical diagrams of Eu-
ler, Venn and Peirce on which spider diagrams are based. Using Peirce’s
concepts and classification of signs, we analyse the ways in which dif-
ferent sign types are exploited in the notation. Our hope is that this
analysis may be of interest beyond those readers particularly interested
in spider diagrams, and act as a case study in deconstructing a simple
visual logic. Along the way, we discuss the need for a deeper semiotic
engagement in visual modelling.
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1. Introduction
The mid 1990s saw a remarkable growth of interest in logical diagrams which,
after centuries of importance, had received less attention for the previous hun-
dred years. Throughout the twentieth century, the success of symbolic logics
appeared to reduce the diagrammatic notations of Venn, Peirce and their
contemporaries to the status of novelties (see [31] for a survey of the history
of diagrammatic logics and the processes that led to this period of relative
neglect). Venn and Euler diagrams were valued, as they are today, for their
ability to illustrate basic logical concepts to beginners, but not generally as
a tool for logicians. The importance of Charles Peirce’s graphical logics was
recognised by some (notably Zeman [50], Roberts [35] and Sowa [40]) but
the situation did not begin to change in earnest until the work of researchers
such as Allwein [1], Barwise [4], Etchemendy [5] and others. The work of
Sun-Joo Shin and Eric Hammer is of particular importance to this story:
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separately [39, 18] and in collaboration with each other [19], Shin and Ham-
mer were influential in reassessing the status of logical diagrams, analysing
their formal properties and picking up again the task of understanding the
origin of the potential advantages of diagrams over what had come to be seen
by some as “real” logic. Their work at this time often included an apologia in-
tended to rehabilitate the reputation of diagrams after their period of neglect
in mathematics in general (e.g. [39, p3]).
Meanwhile, a plethora of software engineering diagrams had been de-
veloped since the 1970s. These were required in order to design, test and
document conceptual models for software systems of ever increasing com-
plexity. Notations included formal systems such as StateCharts [20], Entity
Relationship Diagrams [9] and the semi-formal and unformalised notations
that were combined to produce the Unified Modelling Language [26]. Ap-
proaches to the design of diagrams for software tended to be ad hoc; in 2002
it was still necessary for Hitchman to point out that “the details of conceptual
modelling notations are important”:
Very little is documented about why particular graphical conven-
tions are used. Texts generally state what a particular symbol
means without giving any rationale for the choice of symbols or
saying why the symbol chosen is to be preferred to those already
available. The reasons for choosing graphical conventions are gen-
erally shrouded in mystery. [21]
Thus, we have two distinct and, for the most part but not entirely, dis-
joint communities and bodies of knowledge. In one, diagrammatic reasoning
was explored in ways which carried on the projects of its originators. In the
second, the goals of precise visual modelling answered the pressing needs of
industry. This provides a brief and admittedly reductive sketch of the con-
text in which spider diagrams appeared. Spider diagrams are based on Euler
diagrams with the addition of syntax to represent individuals, and were first
presented by Gil et al. in 1999 [15]. They arose within the visual modelling
community but also took inspiration from the world of logical diagrams, es-
pecially in terms of their formalisation. Spider diagrams are notable for their
influence within visual modelling and, of particular interest for this work, for
their position at the meeting point of two diagrammatic cultures.
In the years since spider diagrams appeared Hitchman’s advice has, to
some degree at least, been heeded. The mathematicians, computer scientists,
empiricists and others who study the application of logical diagrams in more
or less scientific ways (whom we will call diagram scientists) call on results
from cognitive science, human-computer interaction and elsewhere in order
to understand existing notations and to design better ones. We believe that
knowledge, terminology and approaches from semiotics and the philosophy of
diagrams, however, are still underused, and that this has serious implications.
In this paper we have two main goals. Firstly, we will analyse, along
Peircean lines, the notation of spider diagrams, identifying strengths and
weaknesses of the diagrammatic language. Our hope is that this analysis
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may be of interest beyond those readers particularly interested in spider
diagrams, and act as a case study in deconstructing a fairly simple visual
notation. Secondly, we attempt to highlight and challenge a gap in terminol-
ogy and technique between the philosophy of logic notation and the modern
visual modelling community. In section 2 of this paper we describe the spider
diagram notation and its evolution since its original appearance. In section
3 we analyse the semiotics of the notation with respect to Peirce’s view of
diagrammatic reasoning and sign function. We also revisit the goals of the
designers of spider diagrams, making every effort to avoid the temptation of
explanation via hindsight. We note the regular reinvention in diagram sci-
ence of concepts familiar within the philosophy of diagrams. This leads us to
conclude by examining what can be learned from a re-engagement with the
ideas of those philosophers who produced, for very different purposes, the
foundations of modern diagram science.
2. History and overview
Spider diagrams were first presented in two papers that appeared at the sym-
posium Visual Languages 1999. These were Formalizing Spider Diagrams [15]
and Reasoning with Spider Diagrams [24]. Since that time spider diagrams
have had a significant impact within the visual modelling community, both
in their own right and as the basis for more expressive logics. Part of the
contribution they made in their own right was in the gradual refinement
of an unambiguous abstract syntax suitable for developing meta-theoretical
results such as logical completeness and expressiveness (for instance, [23]),
and for the development and extension of techniques for reaching those re-
sults diagrammatically (i.e. without translating to symbolic forms known to
be complete or to have a certain level of expressiveness) [8]. Research on
the language was carried out mainly (but not only) at the Visual Modelling
Group (VMG) at the University of Brighton, to which the authors belong.
Other logics based on spider diagrams are spider diagrams of order [11], con-
straint diagrams [28, 43, 14], generalized constraint diagrams [41] and concept
diagrams [42].
The first of this family of languages to appear was constraint diagrams,
an example of which appears in figure 15 in the next section. Constraint
diagrams are more expressive than spider diagrams, including as they do
syntax for universal quantification and binary relations, and the full system
is undecidable. In their earliest presentation, constraint diagrams suffer from
ambiguity, since no reading order is imposed on the diagrammatic elements
that represent quantifiers. Thus, spider diagrams were first produced by re-
moving syntax from constraint diagrams in order to define a decidable frag-
ment which would make the task of formalising the more expressive notation
tractable.
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In the rest of this section we will describe the spider diagram language
informally, while also tracing some relevant aspects of the development of the
notation. Full details of the formalisation can be found in [25].
2.1. Circles and existential spiders
Figure 1 shows a spider diagram, in which the boundary rectangle represents
the universe of discourse. Closed curves represent sets and are labelled to
indicate the set in question. Dots, or solid circles, are called existential spiders,
or simply spiders, when there is no possibility of confusion with the other
kinds of spider described later in the section. Spiders represent the existence
of individuals in the sets denoted by the region in which they are placed.
Spiders were inspired by Peirce’s X-sequences, except that distinct spiders
represent distinct individuals (other than in certain circumstances described
below). In figure 1 the spider placed in the region inside A and B indicates
that the set (A ∩B)− C has at least one individual in it.
A B C
Figure 1. A spider diagram
Spiders can have several feet, meaning that several dots are joined by
edges and denoting an individual in one of the regions in which its feet are
placed. In figure 1 the spider with two feet indicates that something exists in
either B − (A ∪C) or C − (A ∪B). Thus, at the concrete level, a spider is a
graph and a spider with several feet provides disjunctive information. Labels
on existential spiders are for convenience only; the individuals denoted are
anonymous. The edges between a spider’s feet are called its legs and the union
of regions in which its feet are placed is called its habitat. An unshaded region
with no spiders in it may or may not be populated. Shaded regions are empty
apart from any individuals which are represented as spiders. Thus, the region
in figure 1 that denotes A− (B ∪C) contains at least two individuals, due to
the spiders, and there at most two, due to the shading.
The diagram in figure 1 displays what we will call the core syntax of
unitary spider diagrams: circles, shading and existential spiders. Furthermore,
it is a unitary diagram; compound diagrams, representing the conjunction,
disjunction and negation of diagrams are formed by the juxtaposition, joining
by horizontal lines and placing horizontal lines above diagrams, respectively.
The meaning of the diagram in figure 2 is equivalent to (d1 ∧ ¬d2) ∨ d3.
A piece of notation which was part of the original presentation but has
not been pursued is the labelling of individual zones (regions in the diagram
with no other region as a proper subset). Zone labels are distinguished from
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A D B CA
B
C
Figure 2. A compound spider diagram
contour labels by being underlined. Figure 3 shows the use of zone labels,
where the zone labelled D shows the set (A ∩B)− C.
A B
CD
Figure 3. Zone labels
The original presentation also contained a number of other notational
devices, all of which provide “syntactic sugar” but do not alter the expres-
siveness of the system (some of these devices do change the expressiveness
of unitary diagrams). These are projections, which provide a way to show
a particular set intersection of interest without needing to specify the en-
tire context, and devices which alter the meaning of spiders: ties, strands,
constant spiders and Schro¨dinger spiders.
2.2. Projections
A projection is a dashed contour which denotes the intersection of a set within
a particular context. In figure 4, diagram (b) depicts the entire set A, whereas
diagram (a) shows just that part of A which intersects with C and D. The
projection in diagram (a) is labelled X but it requires an additional label,
(A), which gives its determining set. The motivation behind this device was
to produce less cluttered diagrams.
2.3. Other spiders
Strands and ties provide ways of joining distinct spiders to show that they
may denote the same individual, or do denote the same individual, respec-
tively. Strands are curved lines between spiders. In figure 5 the strand joining
the two spiders in A but outside B asserts that they may represent the same
individual. Strands increase the expressiveness of unitary diagrams since they
can be used to depict a situation that would otherwise require several unitary
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Figure 4. A projection and its semantics, taken from [15]
diagrams in disjunction. In same the same figure, B contains two spiders: one
with two feet, placed in the zones denoting A ∩ B and B − A respectively,
and one with a single foot, placed in B −A. The two spiders are joined with
a tie, or double line, for equality, asserting that they represent the same in-
dividual. Note that this means that the individual in question must inhabit
a set denoted by a zone in which both spiders have a foot (B − A, in this
case).
A B
Figure 5. Strands and ties
Schro¨dinger spiders are small clear circles, or unfilled dots, and represent
elements which might not exist. In figure 6 zone C is shaded and contains
three Schro¨dinger spiders, meaning that it represents a set which is either
empty or contains exactly one element, or exactly two elements, or exactly
three elements. Note that if zone C were not shaded, the presence of these
spiders would give us no information at all, since an unshaded region already
contains at least as many elements as are depicted. This device was motivated
by the common need in software modelling to depict optional elements.
Constant spiders are small solid squares that represent named individ-
uals; figure 7 shows an example which says that an element named x exists
and inhabits either A−B or B−A. Like existential spiders and Schro¨dinger
spiders, they may have several feet which may be joined by regular (straight)
legs, strands or ties. Constant spiders do not extend the expressiveness of the
logic [44] and are, again, inspired by the needs of software modelling.
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A B
C
Figure 6. Schro¨dinger spiders
A B
x
Figure 7. Constant spiders
2.4. Inference rules
The first paper on reasoning [24] defined the following five inference rules.
This is not a logically complete set, and the motivation was to give a flavour
of reasoning with the logic. A complete set of rules appears in [23].
2.4.1. Introducing a strand. This rule allows us to add a strand between two
spider feet in the same zone or to replace a tie by a strand. In each case it
weakens information. In figure 8 the diagram on the right can be obtained
by two applications of this rule to the diagram on the left.
Figure 8. Introducing a strand
2.4.2. Erasure of an element. This rule allows the erasure of either a contour,
the shading from a zone, an entire spider or the tie between two spiders. The
original paper gives examples of how to do this while preserving the meaning
of shading and spiders. See figure 9.
8 Jim Burton and John Howse
A A
Figure 9. Erasing an element
2.4.3. Spreading the feet of a spider. This rule allows us to add a new foot
to any spider, s, in a zone which is not currently part of the habitat of s.
Figure 10 shows an example.
A B A B
Figure 10. Spreading the feet of a spider
2.4.4. Introduction of a contour. We can add a new contour to a diagram
so that it splits every existing zone into the parts which are inside and,
respectively, outside of the new contour. Figure 11 demonstrates that this
may mean adding feet to spiders to maintain validity.
Figure 11. Introduction of a contour
2.4.5. Equivalence of Euler and Venn form. This rule allows us to replace a
diagram in which some zones are missing with its Venn form, in which the
zones which were previously missing are added as shaded zones. It also allows
us to replace a diagram that contains shaded zones with one in which those
zones are missing.
As we have seen, the original five rules were notably high level and can
be used in different contexts to achieve different things. In later presentations
the emphasis would be on simpler rules, which make it clearer which rules
are being deployed in a proof and simplify the proofs of validity of the rules.
In addition to rules above, the reasoning paper gave a process for combining
two unitary diagrams, without formalising the process as an inference rule.
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A B
C
A B
C
Figure 12. Equivalence of Euler and Venn form
In the example shown in figure 13, D1 and D2 are combined to produce D.
The habitats of constant spiders s and t in D are the intersections of their
habitats in D1 and D2. In zone B −A, s and t are connected by a strand in
D1 and a tie in D2; hence in D they are connected by a tie. In zone A∩B, s
and t are separated in D1 and connected by a strand in D2; hence in D they
are separated.
Figure 13. Combining diagrams, taken from [24]
2.5. Abstract syntax
In this paper we are mainly concerned with concrete syntax, as represent-
ing the “user interface” or final designed product of spider diagrams. But
the usefulness of spider diagrams as a logic depended of course on formal
properties such as the soundness of its inference rules, the completeness of a
given set of rules, and so on. The task of cleanly separating details of drawn
diagrams from their meaning was a major preoccupation, and all of these
goals mean that the abstract syntax (or symbolic form) of spider diagrams is
an important consideration, and so we give a brief flavour of it here.
In [15] an abstract diagram is defined as a tuple,
d = (C,Z,Z∗,S,S∗, η),
as follows:
1. C is the set of contours in d.
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2. Z and Z∗ are the sets of zones and shaded zones, respectively (so Z∗ ⊆
Z). A zone is given as a pair of sets of contours, (in, out), where in
contains those contours inside the zone and out contains those contours
outside the zone. It must be true that in ∩ out = ∅ and in ∪ out = C,
for every zone.
3. S and S∗ are the sets of existential spiders and Schro¨dinger spiders,
respectively, and S∗ ⊆ S.
4. η : S → R∪ ∅ is a function that gives the habitat of spiders.
A
B
C
Figure 14. Abstract syntax
In figure 14, C = {A,B,C}. Z is comprised of the following zones:
({A}, {B,C}), ({A,B}, {C}), ({C}, {A,B}), and (∅, {A,B,C}). There is one
shaded zone, and so Z∗ = {({A,B}, {C})}. We omit the definitions of S, for
reasons of space.
2.6. Semantics
Following the style of Hammer and Shin, spider diagrams are given a model-
theoretic semantics. A translation between elements of the abstract syntax
and a given universe is established. A model is a triple (U,ψ,Ψ), where U
is the universal domain, ψ maps spiders onto elements in U and Ψ maps
contours onto subsets of U . The meaning of a spider diagram is then given
as the conjunction of the following expressions:
1. The Plane Tiling Condition: the union of the sets depicted in the dia-
gram is equal to the universal domain,
2. The Spider Condition: ψ maps spiders to elements of the sets repre-
sented by the zones those spiders inhabit,
3. The Strangers Condition: ψ maps distinct spiders to distinct elements
of U ,
4. The Mating Condition, spiders joined by ties really do represent the
same individual, and
5. The Shading Condition: the set represented by a shaded zone contains
no elements other than those represented by spiders.
This concludes the overview of the notation. In the next section we
analyse the concrete syntax of spider diagrams and its relation to other logical
diagrams.
Semiotics of Spider Diagrams 11
3. Design and semiotics
We begin by examining the context in which spider diagrams were developed,
including the goals of the designers, before analysing in turn each component
of the notation.
First, did the designers’ goals emphasise diagrammatic logic or visual
modelling? The titles of the two original papers were Formalizing Spider Di-
agrams and Reasoning with Spider Diagrams. As the titles suggest, the initial
emphasis was on spider diagrams as a logic, rather than on their use by non-
logicians in visual modelling. Thus, the concerns of the authors were with such
matters as creating adequate abstract syntax to guarantee the precision of
the system, developing sound and complete sets of inference rules, establish-
ing the formal expressiveness of the logic, and so on. Indeed, spider diagrams
in themselves are not expressive enough for many software modelling tasks;
as described in the previous section, they were first defined as a fragment
of a more expressive notation which had been proposed as an augmentation
to UML Class Diagrams [26], which would extend their expressiveness and
precision. This motive positions constraint diagrams as straddling the disci-
plines of logic and visual modelling. As well as the syntax of circles, shading
and spiders, constraint diagrams include universal spiders (asterisks) to rep-
resent universal quantification and arrows to represent binary relations. They
allow the use of unlabelled (or derived) curves as the target (and, in some
presentations, the source) of an arrow, allowing the user to determine in this
way the domain and range of relations. Figure 15 shows an example. Several
factors made the task of formalising constraint diagrams more difficult than
anticipated. Firstly, note that the introduction of explicit universal quantifi-
cation makes it necessary to impose a reading order on spiders. The diagram
in figure 15 is intended to convey a constraint equivalent to the sentence
“for all libraries, l, each copy of a book, c, in the collection of l relates to
a particular publication, p, and each library reservation of c relates to the
same publication, p”. However, there is nothing to stop us reading one of
the existential spiders first and coming up with a reading such as “there is
a book which is in the collection of every library, and of which every copy is
reserved”.
Furthermore, the scope of universal spiders was problematic. In figure 15
the universal spider inside the curve labelled Copies inhabits a zone formed
from the labelled curve OnHold and an unlabelled curve representing the
image of the collection relation when its domain is restricted to Libraries. In
this case, the universal spider in Libraries and the arrow sourced on it are
required in order to construct the habitat of the universal spider in Copies.
In figure 16, there are two universal spiders attached to arrows, each of which
constructs the habitat of the other. This rules out a straightforward reading,
unless we take the universal spiders as a quantifiers ranging over all of A
and B. These questions relating to representing the structure of a formula
within a constraint diagram were eventually solved, but they also prompted
the focus on a more tractable and logically decidable fragment.
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Figure 15. A constraint diagram, taken from [15]
A B
* *
f
f
Figure 16. The scope of universal spiders
In 1994, when Shin’s book on Venn diagrams [39] appeared, the task
of formalising logical diagrams was a novel problem. The importance of dis-
tinguishing concrete from abstract syntax was not yet entirely understood,
and although Shin was aware of this problem ([39, p49]), she does mix the
two in places in that work; e.g. in section 3.3.1, Set Assignments, details of
concrete diagrams are mapped directly onto the underlying semantics ([39,
p64]). In joint work, Shin and several of the authors of spider diagrams were
to solve a number of problems relating to the relationship between the seman-
tic, abstract and concrete levels, a necessary task before notations such as
constraint diagrams could be formalised effectively [22]. For these reasons, the
complexity of constraint diagrams caused their designers to focus on a more
manageable fragment, and this led to the development of spider diagrams.
Despite the emphasis on diagrammatic reasoning in the earliest publications,
the design goals could be said to have been inherited from constraint diagrams
and reflect the concerns of visual modelling:
• give the user a lot of freedom about what they depict and how,
• devise features that produce less cluttered diagrams, and
• favour resemblance over convention.
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We will revisit these design goals below when considering the elements of
the notation. Next we examine the terminology and concepts used to reason
about the effectiveness of spider diagrams and related logics.
3.1. Icons, well matchedness and free rides
Early publications on spider diagrams motivated the use of logical diagrams
by appealing to their “natural” and “intuitive” properties (e.g. [15]), without
attempting a precise explanation of what it might mean in practice to possess
these properties. However this “naturalness” might arise, the argument was
that it would enable people without logical training to make precise state-
ments (specifically, to produce conceptual models of one sort or another).
In more recent publications (e.g. [32], whose subject is concept diagrams,
based on spider diagrams) the justification has become more systematic and
proceeds along the following lines:
• Arguing that Euler-based notations make good use of Gestalt principles
of grouping (e.g. similarity and continuity of form) [12].
• Appeals to phenomena such as Gurr’s notion of well matchedness [17]
and Shimojima’s free (or cheap) rides [38, 37],
• Empirical work (e.g. Blake et al. [7]), interpreted with reference to the
above.
Well matchedness and free rides are of special relevance to our discus-
sion, both because they have been enormously influential ideas among dia-
gram scientists and because, as we will explore, they are partial recreations of
concepts first explained in detail by Peirce. Peirce’s triad of semiotic modes
(icons, indices and symbols) is also known and referred to within the mod-
elling community but, arguably, its consequences and especially the nature
of iconicity are not the subject of prolonged discussion.
We begin by examining well matchedness. In his 1999 paper [17], Gurr
proposes the term and associates well matchedness with intuition and nat-
uralness (possibly giving the grateful diagram scientist a technical term to
replace two which are a little doubtful and vague):
Taking seriously the assertion that diagrams are useful because
they are intuitive (well matched to meaning) and natural (directly
capture this well matched meaning), then for any formal under-
pinning of diagrams in software engineering to be truly useful it
must therefore reflect these intuitive and natural aspects of dia-
grams. [17]
Gurr uses Euler’s circles to represent the BARBARA syllogism and
notes that the diagrams provide “a classic example of [the] direct capture of
semantic information in a visual symbol [...] The transitive, irreflexive and
asymmetric relation of set inclusion is expressed via the similarly transitive,
irreflexive and asymmetric visual of proper spatial inclusion in the plane.”
That is, Euler’s circles are well matched to their meaning. Gurr shows that
representing the same problem with Venn diagrams results in a less well
matched representation, indicating that this is an analogue property which
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yields a scale or spectrum. This is generalised as follows, in which the ap-
peal to resemblance appears to mark the rediscovery of (part of) Peircean
iconicity:
[T]he effectiveness of a representation is to a significant extent
determined by how closely the semantics of the representation
resembles that which it represents. One benefit that certain di-
agrammatic representations offer to support this is the potential
to directly capture pertinent aspects of the represented artifact
(whether this be a concrete artifact or some abstract concept). [17]
How does the language of diagrams science correspond with Peirce’s
semiotics, in particular with a nuanced notion of iconicity? Well matchedness
as correspondence between syntax and semantics is the essence of Peirce’s
earlier definitions of iconicity: an icon is “a sign that functions by means of
shared characteristics between the sign and the object” [46]. Resemblance is
a notoriously slippery concept, and Stjernfelt notes the questions surround-
ing this definition: “what is the basis of the ‘similarity’ between the sign and
its object? Is it a psychological experience of resemblance, or a relational
property?” [47]. In the case of well matchedness, at least, Gurr intends a re-
lational property or isomorphism. But the essence of iconicity and, moreover,
of logical diagrams themselves as far as Peirce is concerned, is the capacity
for “learning more”: an icon is a sign “from which more information may be
derived” (CP 2.309, quoted in [46]). That is, the iconic sign and its object
are reliably similar under certain transformations. The icon is “the only sign
by the contemplation of which more can be learned than lies in the construc-
tion of the sign” [47]. Writing in 1996, Shimojima describes the phenomenon
of free rides as “[one of the] ways in which operational constraints over di-
agrams intervene in the process of reasoning” [37]. Free rides occur when
the topological properties of a diagram force some logical consequence to be
made explicit, where that consequence would otherwise take several inferen-
tial steps. Diagrams that exhibit free rides are certainly signs from which we
can “learn more”. Gurr, once again: “certain inferences are somehow more
immediate, or even automatic, in diagrams.” In fact, Gurr appears to absorb
the idea of free rides into well matchedness:
[A]n intuitive, or well matched, representation is one which clearly
captures the key features of the represented artifact and further-
more simplifies various desired reasoning tasks. [17]
Both well matchedness and free rides have been influential in visual
modelling and among diagram scientists. For example, according to Google
Scholar, Gurr’s paper Effective diagrammatic communication [16] (which in-
troduced well matchedness) has 120 citations at the time of writing, a large
number for the modestly-sized field; Shimojima’s paper Inferential and ex-
pressive capacities of graphical representations: Survey and some generaliza-
tions [38], which introduced free rides, has 76. In fact, we claim that both well
matchedness and free rides are ideas that have become internalised within
diagram science and, as such, are frequently mentioned or implicitly assumed
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without there necessarily being a perceived need for a citation. The two no-
tions – a resemblance relation and the direct exposure of logical consequence
– reflect different aspects of iconicity. Taken together, they match Stjernfelt’s
notion of operational iconicity : the necessary condition of an iconic sign. Op-
erational iconicity is not the last word on this sign property however, since
Peirce also described icons as signs which describe things “as they really are”.
Icons which reach this high standard of fidelity to reality are called optimally
iconic by Stjernfelt [47], an idea which we explore below. In the rest of this
section we use these ideas in our attempt to analyse the component parts of
spider diagrams and their interaction.
3.2. Circles and shading
The use of circles in spider diagrams mixes the semantics of Euler’s circles [13]
and the later extensions of Venn [49] and Peirce (CP 4.360 [33]). Disregarding
spiders for the moment, the presence of a region in the diagram does not imply
that underlying set is inhabited and shading represents emptiness (Venn-type
semantics). Where curves in the diagram do not overlap, this gives rise to
a “missing region” which is known to be empty (Euler-type semantics). Re-
garding these choices, Gil et al. wrote: “In view of their relative merits [i.e.
Euler’s circles and Venn/Peirce diagrams], it seems natural to combine the
two notations.” [15] The absence of existential import allows the represen-
tation of partial information, something which is essential in the context for
which spider diagrams were designed. Crucially, it avoids the over-specificity
(noted by Venn and Peirce, and which Shimojima calls overdetermined al-
ternatives [37]) of Euler’s circles by allowing the depiction of things which
may not exist. This flexibility is achieved by sacrificing some of the prior
commitment to reality. The interaction between spiders and shading departs
from X-sequences in Venn-Peirce diagrams, in which a shaded region is cer-
tainly empty, meaning that a shaded region that contains an X-sequence
is inconsistent. Spider diagrams relax this rule so that a shaded region can
contain spiders. Rather than denoting emptiness then, shading provides an
upper bound on cardinality, while spiders provide a lower bound, enabling
spider diagrams to assert precise cardinalities. Because the set denoted by
an unshaded zone either contains exactly as many elements as are depicted
by spiders, or at least one more, we can define a rule that carries out the
inference shown in figure 17. The diagram to the right of the turnstile is a
disjunction of two unitary diagrams, as explained below.
A B
C.
A B
C.
A B
C. .
Figure 17. C is either empty or has at least one thing in it
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The direct precedent for this use of circles is from Hammer and Shin’s
version of Euler diagrams (see Euler’s Visual Logic [19]). Hammer and Shin
use the terms class and set interchangeably (though they are referring to
sets), and there appears to be no important distinction for them between
sets and the term Euler used, notion ge´ne´rale. In one sense, it may be that
pragmatism and the goal of flexibility of expression trump a certain type
of philosophical verisimilitude for the authors of modern logical diagrams.
The choice to focus on classes or sets, and whether it is important to make
a distinction between them, is one way of choosing whether it is coherent
to depict things which may not exist. But this is part of a wider pattern
which Moktefi and Shin describe in their survey [31], whereby the “needs
and requirements of the logicians who invented the diagrams” continue to
change over time and are reflected in the systems they construct.
In recent work Moktefi explores the semiotics of Euler’s circles [30] and
concludes that they are not only iconic, but optimally so. This is demon-
strated using an experiment which presents a spatial set (or proposition)
visualisation similar to Euler’s circles but based on intension rather than
extension: “In a diagrammatic scheme founded on intension, a term A (re-
spectively B) is represented with a circle that gathers all the attributes that
are predicated of A (respectively B). Hence, a proposition asserting that ‘Ev-
ery A is B’ would be represented by a circle B inside a circle A.” [30] Using
the intensional notation to reason with syllogisms is something like stepping
through the looking glass. Containment of circles no longer means subsump-
tion of sets, but just the opposite. For the same type of syllogistic task at
which Euler’s circles excel, the intensional notation hinders rather than helps
reasoning. This topsy-turvy notation is, however, well matched to meaning,
in that we can establish an isomorphism between diagram regions and the
semantic level. Although the diagrams do not exhibit free rides, we could ma-
nipulate these intensional diagrams in reliable, albeit constrained, ways once
we understand how the notation works. This experimental notation demon-
strates the limitations of Peirce’s resemblance-based definitions of icons and
of the “structural correspondence” reading of well matchedness; circles do
resemble intents, for some definition of resemblance, and so the diagrams are
well matched but have no convenience of use for reasoning. It appears that
operational iconicity is a necessary but not sufficient reason for free rides.
Moktefi contrasts this with the case of Euler’s circles which “have the
relations that they are said to represent”, giving them the capacity to repre-
sent classes as they really are. This capacity depends on the existential import
of regions – any region enclosed by a curve represents a class with something
in it, and so only things which exist are depicted. The claim that this can
allow intuition to support inference is supported by an empirical study by
Sato et al., which found that readers make significantly fewer mistakes with
Euler’s circles than with Venn diagrams [36].
Thus, while diagram scientists partially reconstructed the notion of
iconicity in the closely related concepts of well matchedness and free rides,
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some concepts and terminology are still lacking if we are to describe the
way signs function within spider diagrams; specifically, the notion of opti-
mal iconicity. As already noted, the use of circles in spider diagrams does
not reach that standard, due to shading and the absence of existential im-
port. Circles represented “general notions” in Euler’s original presentation.
We presume a general notion is something which must exist in order to be
discussed or depicted. In this context, it makes perfect sense that the way
to depict the non-existence of a notion is leave the relevant region out of the
diagram altogether. Figure 18 illustrates this, in which zones such as that
containing A and C but not B or D are missing. Figure 19 demonstrates
the more general approach of Venn – what were non-existent classes in Eu-
ler’s circles are now empty sets, as indicated by shading. A spider diagram
with the same meaning is shown in 20, demonstrating a still more general
approach that would admit either of the two preceding styles.
Figure 18. Missing
zones in Euler’s cir-
cles
Figure 19. “Miss-
ing” zones in a Venn
diagram
Figure 20. “Missing” zones in a spider diagram
To summarise, shading and the removal of existential import act to re-
duce the iconicity of circles in spider diagrams. The retreat to a more symbolic
or conventional mode brings much flexibility of expression. This pattern is
repeated in other syntactic choices – however powerful iconicity may be, espe-
cially with regard to making explicit the consequences of a logical expression,
it is at times too powerful. A commitment to saying things “as they really are”
means removing choice about how they are said, resulting in overdetermina-
tion. With symbolic features, we choose the convention to adopt, tempering
the doctrinaire power of resemblance. That freedom to choose between styles
of expression is of particular importance for the visual modelling task, given
the prevalence of partial information. Nevertheless, when compared to Eu-
ler’s circles, with all their limitations, the innovations are in some sense an
18 Jim Burton and John Howse
anti-diagrammatic turn. The new flexibility is influenced in this case at least
partly by software engineering, as much as Venn’s innovations were influenced
by his interest in symbolic, especially Boolean, logic [31]. As Venn diagrams
mark the move away from syllogistic reasoning to the increasing complexity
of symbolic logic, so the use of circles in spider diagrams mark the new use
case for logical diagrams of generalised conceptual modelling.
3.3. Projections
Many logicians, including Peirce, previously used the dashed line to suggest
possible information, whereas projections represent information which is cer-
tain but partially specified. The diagram in figure 21 deploys one of its circles
in a symbolic and conventionalised way, requiring a kind of “higher order” of
visualisation on the part of the reader, who may only speculate about where
else the set A appears after the parts of no interest are shorn away.
Figure 21. Projections and higher order visualisation
Projections are primarily a powerful way of getting rid of clutter, or
redundant syntax [27], as demonstrated by the example in section 2, figure 4.
Clutter has been shown to have important practical implications for creating
diagrams people can readily understand [2]. The dashed curve of a projection
introduces a symbolic dimension to the usual meaning of a closed curve drawn
with a solid line. There are important differences in the ways each type of
curve denotes a set. For instance, it is not valid to remove an unshaded
zone from a unitary diagram but it is always valid to “reduce” a projection,
since that merely means that a smaller intersection is to be displayed. Thus,
projections are a device that diminishes iconicity for practical reasons. This is
no small matter, since it reduces the capacity of the diagram to offer free rides
and to support intuition; one might say it reduces the capacity of the diagram
to support inference, in fact. It is done, however, to enable the modelling of
complex ideas in succinct ways. As an example of the distance travelled from
the satisfyingly simple, iconic properties of earlier spatial logics, figure 22
shows a Venn-6 spider diagram constructed by embedding one Venn diagram
inside another. (We abuse the notation here to make a more legible diagram;
each projection should really have its own label.) Interestingly, and although
the spider diagram authors were not aware of it at the time, projections
appear to have been anticipated in a diagrammatic experiment by Peirce;
Pietarinen examined Peirce’s manuscript example of embedding Venn-4 in
Venn-4 in [34].
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Figure 22. Venn-6 with projections
3.4. Spiders
Spiders, the most distinctive and eponymous feature of this notation, express
lower bounds on cardinality – any region contains at least as many elements as
there are spiders entirely contained within that region. Used in combination
with shading, which places an upper bound, spiders allow the assertion of
exact cardinalities, and spider diagrams were the first widely known logical
diagram to do so.1
Just as Peirce believed the ways in which icons, indices and symbols are
perceived correspond to and may provide examples of his three phenomeno-
logical categories (firstness, secondness and thirdness) [45], so he also believed
that icons, indices and symbols should be used to depict the types of informa-
tion that pertain to the corresponding categories. These are hypotheses, facts
about experience and general laws, respectively ( [33, 3.460] cited in [29]).
Thus, predominantly indexical signs should be used to denote facts about
experience, such as existence, and this matches the purpose and function of
spiders well. An existential spider with a single foot is strongly indexical, as-
serting that “there is something here”, something that falls into the category
of secondness, exemplified by those things we may “put our shoulder against”
([33, 3.240], cited in [3]). The single-footed spider also has iconic properties
arrived at via its placement in the diagram. A diagram in which each spider
has a single foot, such as that in figure 23, is called an α-diagram.
A purely conventional feature (the “leg”, or edge between feet) is used to
create spiders with more than one foot. The spider’s leg denotes disjunction,
but could just as well mean something else. (We don’t have much choice about
whether to use a conventional feature – Shin noted the difficulty of depicting
1Peirce appears to have achieved this first too, as shown in marginalia uncovered by Pietari-
nen [34].
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A
B .
Figure 23. An α-diagram
A
B ...
Figure 24. Spiders
with several feet
logical disjunction using resemblance [39, p180].) The indexical property of
the spider is thus diluted: “there is something here, or here, or here...” (see
figure 24). Spiders with several feet then provide an example of a sign that
functions in all three modes. Firstly, the feet themselves are indexical. You
can “put your shoulder” against them, in Peirce’s memorable phrase. The
placement of the feet is iconic since their presence in a certain part of the
diagram “has the relation it depicts”, and free rides may occur because of
the assertion made by placement, allowing us to learn more. Finally, the legs
are symbolic, being a convention for disjunction.
Spiders’ legs increase the expressiveness of unitary diagrams, but not of
the system as a whole. We could do without them by forming a disjunction of
unitary parts, as in figure 25, which has an equivalent meaning to figure 24.
Again, a conventional, less diagrammatic addition (legs) allows for succinct
expression, getting rid of clutter.
A
B
. A
B. A B .
Figure 25. A disjunctive spider diagram
Constant spiders do not increase expressiveness (see [44] for a formal
discussion) but are very useful for modelling.2. Strands, ties and Schro¨dinger
spiders fall into the category of conventional devices which reduce clutter.
Strands and ties diminish the iconicity of spiders, since a single spider no
longer necessarily represents a single individual.
Alternative semantics for ties are possible. We might decide that the two
elements are equal only if they inhabit the same set, i.e. that the tie denotes
a relationship between spiders’ feet, rather than the spiders themselves. The
semantics given in the previous section (spiders represent equal elements
whenever they are joined by a tie) gives rise to the only form of inconsistency
in a unitary diagram, in fact. Figure 26 demonstrates the problem, as there
is no model in which the spider with three feet could be equal to both of the
single-footed spiders.
2Though focusing on Venn rather than Euler diagrams, Choudhury and Chakraborty were
also to explore the use of named individuals in their 2004 work [10]
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A B
Figure 26. In-
consistency from
ties
a c b
Figure 27. Transi-
tivity and strands
A similar transitivity issue applies to strands. In figure 27 we may want
to assert that a and b may be equal, and b and c may be equal, but a is
definitely not equal to c. This non-transitive interpretation, whereby both
strands and ties govern only the particular foot to which they are attached,
leads to more explicit diagrams having less potential for misunderstanding
but with a corresponding increase in clutter.
The Schro¨dinger spider represents an optional value, sometimes called
a “Maybe” type, something which plays an important part in software spec-
ification. In practice, however, this spider is impossible to tell apart from a
small curve. As well as the unfortunate possibility of confusing two types of
notation which are meant to convey different things, Peirce’s pairing of sign
types with types of information described above may give us a clue as to
why Schro¨dinger spiders may be problematic. Here, a sign (the circle) which
is elsewhere used successfully to depict “theorems” in an iconic way (for in-
stance depicting the theorem A ⊆ B by placing one circle inside another),
is used to denote the possible existence of an individual, a denotation which
calls for an indexical sign.
3.5. Compound spider diagrams
Finally, we consider the various ways in which unitary diagrams can be joined
to form compound diagrams. Compound diagrams express the conjunction,
disjunction or negation of their unitary components. The first presentation
used a minimal approach: juxtaposition for conjunction and unitary diagrams
joined with horizontal lines to represent disjunction. Both notational choices
were used by Peirce but entered spider diagrams through Shin’s Venn-II. A
horizontal bar above a unitary diagram represents negation. Nested boxes
provide bracketing, or scope. See figure 28 for an example.
A
B
. A
B. A B .
Figure 28. The original form of compound diagrams
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Like projections, diagrams featuring several boundary rectangles require
another piece of “higher order” visualisation from the reader. If the rectangle
represents the universe of discourse then what does it mean to depict several
of them at once? It may be straightforward to see that two such universes at
the same level (i.e. without any nesting) are meant to be read in conjunction
(as two aspects of a single universe) or disjunction (as two possible universes).
When nesting one boundary rectangle within another these abstractions can
obviously begin to mount up, but there is probably no possibility of a “nat-
ural” depiction of such complex and abstract ideas.
Later versions of the notation experiment with a more elaborate scheme
whereby unitary diagrams are enclosed in a rectangle which has a conven-
tional symbolic operator written in the top left corner. The diagram in fig-
ure 29 has the same meaning as that in figure 28.
A
B
. A
B. A B .
Figure 29. The later form of compound diagrams
This second approach was not pursued. We would argue it was less suc-
cessful than the original form of compound diagrams for two main reasons;
it makes poor use of space and is less diagrammatic. Juxtaposition clearly
seems to be an iconic and effective way to represent conjunction, a diagram-
matic form which has the relation it represents; the existence or presence of
the two things juxtaposed. In the style of figure 29, all unitary parts within
a bounding rectangle are juxtaposed and one must read the mathematical
symbol to see which logical relation is in effect. Last but not least, the earlier
way of forming compound diagrams emerges from a long-established tradi-
tion familiar to many readers and, as Peirce observed in his remarks on the
ethics of notation, we should acknowledge and learn from previous notational
efforts; if we go on to reject them, we should at least have a good reason for
doing so (MS 530, 1904, see footnote in [6]).
3.6. Inference rules
The rules in [24] are given informally (i.e. without using the abstract syntax).
An overall goal in designing the rules was that they should be diagrammatic.
That is, they should be inspired by the forms of diagrams rather than being
translations of algebraic identities into diagrammatic form. The idea was not,
in the original presentation, to present a minimal or logically complete set
of rules, or for the rules to be atomically simple, but to give a flavour of the
notation and of the forms reasoning with it would take. The result, however,
is that the rules are defined in ways which are unnecessarily, if deliberately,
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broad. Rule 2, Erasure of a diagrammatic element, is one such rather un-
focused rule; the elements that can be removed from diagrams are shading,
spiders and circles. If formalisation was the primary concern it would have
been preferable to define simpler rules, one for each diagrammatic element.
More importantly, simpler rules would benefit the users of the logic when
choosing which rule to apply or following a proof. Similarly, rule 5, Equiva-
lence of Venn and Euler forms, is a high level rule that does several things at
once. The same purpose, converting a diagram into Venn form, could have
been better served by a simpler rule which allows adding a single shaded
zone, which could then be applied repeatedly.
Several of the rules do have an appealing visual perspicuity: if the reader
knows that spider’s leg represent disjunction then the example given of Rule
3, spreading spiders legs, should need no further explanation. There are sev-
eral ways in which we could define Rule 4, which introduces a contour. For
instance, there is no need to depict the intersection of the new contour with
regions that are known to be empty. However, the rule is defined in an, ar-
guably, more intuitive way by splitting every existing region in two.
Rules 1 and 3, concerning strands and spiders’ feet respectively, are
weakening rules. There was a tendency in later presentations to void weak-
ening rules, defining inferences instead as equivalences for the convenience of
the designers (e.g. in order to aid the process of proving completeness).
We have shown in this section that the spider diagram notation extends
and adapts systems such as Venn-II. We have tried to trace the way in which
many, but not all, of these changes were made primarily, at least in the earliest
presentations, with conceptual modelling rather than logical reasoning in
mind. In summary, the new devices such as projections add flexibility of
expression whilst frequently diverging from the goal of creating as direct a
reflection as possible between meaning and the drawn diagram.
4. Conclusion
Echoing the title of a well known work on the philosophy of science, a possible
subtitle for this article could be The Spontaneous Philosophy of Spider Di-
agrams. We have observed that scientists have a tendency to underestimate
or ignore the impact of implicit philosophies in their work, or to believe that
their only guiding principles are pragmatism and the “scientific method”.
Unless the philosophies which drive the work of diagram scientists are made
explicit then they cannot be reflected on and are effectively impossible to
modify, giving them the status of ideologies. The self-directed accusation is
that diagram science needs to be reconnected to the concerns and goals of
the philosophers that produced the logical diagrams on which their work is
based.
In the previous section we presented several examples of the robustly
practical principles which drove the design of spider diagrams. We have also
noted that this is part of the natural evolution of logical diagrams, as they
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are deployed to represent more and more complex and abstract states of af-
fairs. As a final example, Gil et al. noted that we can’t use spider diagrams to
say |A| = |B| for disjoint sets A and B: “In order to retain the intuitiveness
of spider diagrams, constraints such as this should be placed in an auxiliary
textual annotation” [15] (emphasis added). Does this readiness to abandon
not only faithfulness to reality but also diagrammatic form itself in order for
convenience, flexibility and expressiveness matter? In terms of the fitness-for-
purpose of spider diagrams, almost certainly not. But these questions did of
course matter to the authors of the original notations on which spider dia-
grams are based. Icons, indices and symbols are not only linked by Peirce to
his three categories of experience, but are exemplars of the categories [45].
In this way, a diagram made of icons, indices and symbols forms a “categori-
cal mirror” that reflects nothing less than human experience. This ambitious
diagrammatic vision is bold but should not be surprising as it merely places
logical diagrams on a level with philosophical logic more broadly as a tool to
analyse and explore reasoning and knowledge acquisition. This is beyond the
scope of the current work, but is mentioned to highlight the philosophical
commitment behind the design of Peirce’s sign triad and his semiotic in gen-
eral. The designers of modern logical diagrams could be said to have shown
an equally firm commitment to pragmatism, but would do well to bear in
mind that the component parts of the diagrams they mould into new forms
were not chosen at random.
A better understanding of semiotics and the principles underlying other
logical diagrams can help those people who “only” want to use them in prac-
tical ways (rather than considering their place in any deeper, e.g. phenomeno-
logical, framework). In fact, we have so far made use only of Peirce’s earliest,
least extensive (and most tractable) sign typology. We are interested to see
what can be learned by analysing modern logical diagrams from the perspec-
tive of the more detailed mid and late sign typologies [48][3, p150]. Despite the
possible limitations of our analysis, we uncovered several examples of semi-
otic concepts that were needed, and thus reinvented, in diagrams science.
Spider diagrams were arrived at by extending Euler diagrams in a more or
less purely pragmatic way, and the result proved to be a useful development
on the road to more expressive notations. But diagrams science needs to be
reconnected with its origins, and in particular with a nuanced understanding
of the power and drawbacks of iconicity and resemblance.
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